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EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE
EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE AND CHALLENGES
FOR CAUSE IN MISSOURI*
BY ROBERT E. ROSENWALD
3. Qualifications in Criminal Cases
The qualifications of jurors in criminal cases are regulated
primarily by statutes. Many of them, while significant in their
substance, are plain in their meaning and so obvious in their
nature as to give rise to only a minimum of judicial construc-
tion. These statutes, therefore, may be dealt with in a sum-
mary fashion.
a. Grand Jurors
A law of 1835 provided that "No person who was a member of
the grand jury or inquest by which any indictment or present-
ment was found in any cause shall serve as a petit juror on the
trial of such cause." 12 5 This statute continues in effect.1 26
b. Witnesses
Prior to 1835, the law pertaining to witnesses in criminal
cases was the same as the law in civil cases, already referred
to.127 The law of 1835 which is also the present law follows:
"No witness in any criminal case shall be sworn as a juror there-
in if challenged for that cause before he is sworn; and if any
juror shall know anything relative to the matter in issue, he
shall disclose the same in open court."' 128 In construing the
statute, it has been held that a person who is subpoenaed upon
an application for a change in venue is a competent juror, not a
witness within the terms of the statute.129
* Continued from the April number, 15 ST. Louis L. REV. 266.
R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 6.
"R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 879, sec. 7; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 1190, sec. 9; G. S.
Mo. (1865) p. 849, sec. 9; R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 1893; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec.
4193; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2612; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 5216; R. S. Mo.
(1919) sec. 4010.
. See p. 255, supra.
R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 10; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 879, sec. 11; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 1191, sec. 13; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 849, sec. 12; R. S. Mo.
(1879) sec. 1896; R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 4196; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2615;
R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 5219; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4013.
_ State v. Wisdom (1884) 84 Mo. 177; State v. Marshall (Mo. A. 1917)
198 S. W. 451.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
c. Disqualification of Prosecuting Witnesses, Prosecutors,
Defendants and Their Relatives
Another law which was first enacted in 1835 and which con-
tinues in effect today substantially as of the date of its original
passage, provided, "When any 'indictment alleges an offense
against the person or .property of another, neither the injured
party nor any person of kin to him shall be a competent juror on
the trial of such indictment, nor shall any person of kin to the
prosecutor or defendant in any case serve as a juror on the trial
thereof.18.
In a case decided in 1881, the Supreme Court held that where
a juror testified on his examination that "his father was a second
cousin of the defendant's mother," he was incompetent under the
statute.131 A finer construction of the law is set forth in a case
of 1922 in which the court held that "The clear purpose of the
statute is to secure fair and unprejudiced jurors, and it is in
reality knowledge of any relationship that makes the juror
biased and prejudiced. Where the juror on his voir dire exami-
nation swore that he was not related to deceased, and after a
verdict of guilty it developed that he had never heard before
that he was kin to deceased, the juror was not by reason of that
relationship, assuming that it was proved, incompetent under
the statute." 132 Only favorable criticism can be offered of the
reasonable position assumed by the court in this case.
In the very recent case of State v. Lewis, in which the defend-
ant was accused of receiving a check for deposit as president of a
bank which was then in a failing condition, the counsel for the
defendant undertook to secure the discharge of jurors who were
alleged to be related to bank depositors."'3 Authority for the
challenges was the case of Price v. Protection Co.14  Concern-
ing it, Judge Walker of the Supreme Court said, "There is one
' R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 8; R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 879, sec. 9; R. S.
Mo. (1855) p. 1190, sec. 11; G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 849, sec. 10; R. S. Mo.(1879) sec. 1894; R. S. Mo. (1889) see. 4194; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2613;
R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 5217; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4011.
' State v. Walton (1881) 74 Mo. 271, 285.
' State v. Stewart (1922) 296 Mo. 12, 246 S. W. 939.
' The contention was that the jurors were incompetent under R. S. Mo.(1919) sec. 4011, and R. S. Mv. (1919) sec. 6632, the latter statute being
applicable, if at all, under R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 4023. See p. 244, supra.
See p. 257, supra.
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case in this State . . .which is a suit against an insurance com-
pany to recover losses in which jurors were held disqualified
who were related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity to persons insured in the corporation, the laws of which
made those insured, members of the corporation, and subjected
them to the payment of assessments to cover losses. The dis-
tinctive difference between the facts in that case and the one at
bar becomes apparent upon a statement of the same. In the
former the disqualifying relationship of the jurors was with
persons who were an essential part of the corporation itself.
By them the corporation was created, and through their con-
tinued activities its existence was perpetuated; in the latter the
depositors, being mere creditors, were in no sense such a part of
the corporation as would tend to influence the minds of the
jurors in rendering their verdict." 13 4a
In the Price case the jurors were declared incompetent only
because of a liberal construction of the statute and a piercing of
the corporate entity. While the court in the Lewis case pointed
out several reasons for declaring the jurors qualified under the
particular facts involved, the distinction drawn between corpo-
rate shareholders and bank depositors in determining the com-
petency of jurors does not seem tenable. The opinions of the
jurors might have been the same in either case. In the Price
case the court was held to have acted under statutory authoriza-
tion; in the Lewis case the judge might have discharged the
jurors in his discretion even though no statute declared bank
depositors incompetent, under the circumstances.'5
d. Opposition to Death Penalty and Related Matters
Another act of the legislature of 1835 provided: "Persons
whose opinions are such as to preclude them from finding any
defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death, shall not
be allowed or compelled to serve as jurors on the trial of an in-
dictment for any offense punishable with death."'136 The law
continued in effect until 1925,17 when it was modified to provide
''a State v. Lewis (Mo. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 529, 534.
'See p. 257, supra.
R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 9.
R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 879, sec. 10; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 1190, sec. 12;
G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 849, sec. 11; R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 1895; R. S. Mo.
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that the representative of the state could waive such disqualifi-
cation.13
The Supreme Court has cited the statute in a number of cases
to the effect that whenever the maximum penalty for the crime
of which the defendant is charged is death, the juror is properly
challenged or excused by the court under the statute.180  Before
the amendment of 1925, one decision held that it was proper for
the state to challenge some jurors who had conscientious
scruples and not others, such a procedure being calculated only to
benefit the accused.140  Yet the decision seems to be squarely in
opposition to the strict wording of the statute. However, when
a similar case arose in 1928, the court said, "A juror . . . stated
that he had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the
death penalty. This disqualification was waived by counsel for
the state, and the juror accepted. Authority for this waiver is
found" under the statute as amended.141 In view of the decision
of 1921 it seems that the Supreme Court had arrived at the same
position at that date which the legislature reached by the enact-
ment of 1925. To avoid any possibility of a reversal by the
courts, the legislature acted wisely in amending the statute.
A question closely allied to the subject matter of the statute is
the right of challenge where the juror states that he has con-
scientious scruples which would prevent him from inflicting the
death penalty on circumstantial evidence alone. In one case this
question was brought within the purview of the statute. Judge
Burgess of the Supreme Court said, "By the statute persons
whose opinions are such as to preclude them from finding any
defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death, are incom-
petent to sit as jurors in any such case, and it matters not
whether the evidence of guilt be positive or circumstantial. This
(1889) sec. 4195; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2164; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 6218;
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4012.
'Mo. Laws 1925, p. 196, sec. 4012.
' State v. David (1895) 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28; State v. Gilbert (Mo.
1916) 186 S. W. 1003; State v. Wooley (1908) 215 Mo. 620, 115 S. W. 417;
State v. Tevis (1910) 234 Mo. 276, 136 S. W. 339; State v. Sherman (1914)
264 Mo. 274, 175 S. W. 73; State v. Murphy (1921) 292 Mo. 275, 237 S. W.
529; State v. Cooper (Mo. 1924) 259 S. W. 434; State v. Hayes (Mo. 1924)
262 S. W. 1034.
1 State v. Gore (1921) 292 Mo. 173, 237 S. W. 993.
" State v. Hicks (Mo. 1928) 3 S. W. (2d) 230, 233.
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juror clearly came within the inhibition of the statute, and was
properly excused by the Court."''14 2
The above opinion, rendered in 1895, stands alone in its cita-
tion of the statute as authority, for prior and subsequent deci-
sions arrive at the same result without mention of the statute.
In the leading case of State v. West, a juror was excused by the
court because he said he had scruples against convicting the ac-
cused of murder on circumstantial evidence alone.143 Strangely
enough the court held the juror properly excused on the author-
ity of Chouteau v. Pierre, a civil case which in no way related to
a conviction of murder on circumstantial evidence. 4 4  But the
court in the West case went further by stating that the decision
was based on a rule of fairness; even though no statute disquali-
fied a juror because of malice to the defendant, no court in this
state would permit such a person to serve; by a parallel line of
reasoning, the court was justified in discharging the juror in
this case, in order to preserve impartiality in jury trial. The
general rule is that jurors who admit their inability to impose
the death penalty on circumstantial evidence alone, are properly
excluded." 5
A kindred subject is found in those cases pertaining to preju-
dice or expression of opinion against crime. It was held that a
member of a society liable to assessment for funds to prosecute
violations of liquor laws is not a competent juror to try a de-
fendant charged with the illegal sale of liquor even though the
juror is of the opinion that he can try the case fairly. 1 6 On the
other hand, it was not a ground for challenge of a juror that he
was a member of a commercial club which had passed a resolu-
tion in favor of law enforcement and urging officials to do their
duty in the prosecution of violations of the local option law, the
juror being otherwise qualified.14 7 The cases are distinguish-
able. The general rule is that the expression, or the existence
of bias, or prejudice against crime constitutes no cause for chal-
lenge. 14s
', State v. Punshon (1895) 133 Mo. 44, 34 S. W. 25.
State v. West (1879) 69 Mo. 401. 1 See p. 263, supra.
"' State v. Leabo (1886) 89 Mo. 247, 1 S. W. 288; State v. Young (1893)
119 Mo. 495, 24 S. W. 1038; State v. David (1895) 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W.
28; State v. Bauerle (1898) 145 Mo. 1, 46 S. W. 609; State v. Miller (1900)
156 Mo. 76, 56 S. W. 907. 'State v. Fullerton (1901) 90 Mo. A. 411.
1' State v. Stephens (1916) 195 Mo. A. 34, 189 S. W. 630.
" State v. Burns (1884) 85 Mo. 47; State v. Mace (1914) 262 Mo. 143,
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e. Opinions
By far the largest number of decisions relating to the qualifi-
cation of jurors in criminal cases has arisen under R. S. Mo.
(1919) sec. 4014. That section had its beginning in an act of
1816, providing that jurors who had formed or expressed opin-
ions were disqualified. The provision was repeated in An act of
1825, both laws being referred to above, for they relate to civil
as well as criminal cases.149
In 1826, the law was radically modified. "In all criminal
cases, when the impartiality of a juror is to be tried by the
court, it shall not be a disqualification to a juror that he has form-
ed or delivered an opinion, unless such formation or delivery of
opinion will, in the judgment of the court, bias the juror in mak-
ing up his verdict." 1° Whereas the former law declared incom-
petent, jurors who merely possessed opinions of the cas6, this
law made such jurors competent unless the opinions would bias
the jurors in rendering their verdicts.
The law was amended and revised in 1835. "It shall be a
good cause of challenge to a juror that he has formed or deliver-
ed an opinion on an issue, or any material fact to be tried, but
if it appears that such opinion is founded only on rumor and not
such as to prejudice or bias the mind of the juror, he may be
sworn. ' ' 1 1 The law has remained practically unchanged, ex-
cept for an important amendment in 1879 by which the words
"and newspaper reports" were inserted in the statute after the
word "rumor."'5 2 This is by far the most important statute per-
taining to the qualifications of jurors in criminal cases.
Before considering the many cases which have arisen under
the statute, several preliminary facts should be mentioned. The
practice in civil cases in respect to the impaneling of jurors is
applicable in criminal trials except in cases otherwise pro-
170 S. W. 1105; State v. Daniels and Hamilton (Mo. 1923) 274 S. W. 26;
State v. Lowry (Mo. 1929) 12 S. W. (2d) 469.
See p. 255, supra.
2 Ter. Laws 96, see. 4.
R. S. Mo. (1835) p. 490, sec. 11.
R. S. Mo. (1845) p. 880, sec. 12; R. S. Mo. (1855) p. 1191, sec. 14;
G. S. Mo. (1865) p. 849, sec. 13; R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 1897; R. S. Mo.
(1889) see. 4197; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2616; R..S. Mo. (1909) sec. 5220;
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4014.
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vided. 3 The statute regulating the qualifications of jurors in
civil cases 4 and the criminal statute which has been outlined,
have not been inclusive of all the grounds for challenge for cause
which counsel have undertaken to submit from time to time.155
Referring to the civil statute,156 the Supreme Court has held at
least on three occasions that the reasons for challenging the
juror invoked by counsel, had no legal existence. 7
Returning to a consideration of the statute 55 and the cases
decided under the statute, it will be found that numerous deci-
sions running through from the early history of the state down
to the present date have turned on the construction of this stat-
ute. The rulings of the court are many and varied.
In the case of Lisle v. State, decided in 1840, Judge Napton
took occasion to discuss the statute, for the first time, by way of
dictum. "It is suggested in argument, that the section
is an evasion of the constitutional requisition which declares that
every offender shall have a fair and impartial jury. It is sup-
posed that a juror who has formed an opinion, no matter from
what source of information, is not such an impartial juror as the
constitution contemplates. It may be said however in relation
to this, that it might be a nice point in metaphysics to determine
how far the mind was compelled to assent or to dissent from the
truth of a supposed state of facts, when presented to its con-
templation, and that for the ordinary purposes of life, we are
well assured, that an opinion or rather inclination of the judg-
ment, founded on a supposed state of facts, when it is unaccom-
panied with any prejudice or ill will to the parties concerned,
will very readily be removed and changed, by the presentation of
a different state of facts, and the person whose judgment is in-
voked is as capable of doing justice as though he had never
heard any incorrect or imperfect statement in relation to the
matter." "9
" See p. 244, supra.
1" See pp. 255-256, supra.
See State v. Lewis (Mo. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 529.
R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 6632.
" State v. Meininger (Mo. 1926) 290 S. W. 1007; State v. Griffith (1925)
311 Mo. 630, 279 S. W. 136; State v. Koch (Mo. 1929) 16 S. W. (2d) 205.
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 4014.
Lisle v. State (1840) 6 Mo. 426, 430.
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A construction of the statute was necessary to the opinion
handed down by Judge McBride of the Supreme Court in the
case of Baldwin v. State, decided in 1848. That part of the
opinion relating to the statute is quoted in extenso because of its
unusual historical importance, and because subsequent cases
have referred to the Baldwin case as the first and leading deci-
sion in the construction of the statute:
The juror, having been sworn to answer questions, stated
that he saw statements in regard to the transactions in the
New Orleans public papers; that from these he formed an
opinion, and believes that if the statements were true, he
has an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence; but
he had then no prejudice or bias, nor has he now any against
the defendant. That opinion is now unchanged if the facts
are as stated; he should be governed solely by the evidence;
he has not conversed with any of the witnesses; his opinion
depends solely upon what he saw in the New Orleans pa-
pers; he has conversed on the subject with persons since his
return to St. Louis, but does not know whether or not they
are witnesses.
Before the enactment of the provision hereafter referred
to, great difficulty existed in obtaining a jury to try a crim-
inal cause, which by reason of the circumstances attending
the commission of the act charged, gave it notoriety. In-
quisitiveness is a component part of every rational thinking
mind; when, therefore, an offense of a high grade, or one of
unusual occurrence, or one attended with aggravating cir-
cumstances, takes place, it is but natural that it should be-
come a subject of conversation and inquiry with the com-
munity in which it occurred. This produces impressions
rather than opinions of the guilt or innocence of the party
accused, and hence the difficulty, in some cases, of obtaining
a jury, from the vicinage, free from impressions, amounted
almost to an indemnity for crime. Having witnessed this
state of things, and doubtless being desirous to obviate the
difficulty as far as practicable, the general assembly of this
state passed the following act:
(Then follows the statute.)160
The information upon which the juror predicated his
opinion, was derived from newspaper statements, which,
of all other sources of intelligence, are the most uncertain
and unreliable; gleaned, as such matters are, from the
streets and alleys, beer houses and oyster cellars of a large
I See p. 366, supra.
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commercial city, and without any special pains being taken
to ascertain the particulars of the affair. The juror further
stated that he had no prejudice or bias on his mind. If,
therefore, the question of the competency is referable to the
juror himself, then he was competent; but it was not his
province to pass upon that question; he could only state
fact9, and it was the duty of the court to decide whether,
according to the facts, he was competent. In deciding this
question, the presiding judge at the trial, having the juror
before him, witnessing the manner of his examination, pos-
sessing a knowledge of his character, is infinitely better
qualified than we are to decide whether under all the circum-
stances, his mind and feelings are in a condition which will
enable him to discharge honestly and impartially his duty
as a juror. Where the juror qualifies himself under the
statute, and the presiding judge accepts him, this court
cannot say that an error has been committed.161
Subsequent opinions have treated the Baldwin case as funda-
mentally sound. The last paragraph of that part of the decision
which has been quoted is peculiarly significant, for although the
court refers to newspaper statements as the source of the juror's
opinion, the statute did not affirmatively qualify a juror whose
opinion was founded on newspaper reports, until the amendment
of 1879.162 As will appear hereafter, these facts have been crit-
ically reviewed in the construction of the statute.
Following closely the decision in the Baldwin case, the Su-
preme Court sustained the trial judge who discharged a juror
when challenged by the state. The juror had admitted an opin-
ion formed as a result of reading a newspaper. He was asked
whether, notwithstanding the opinion, he could give the accused
a fair trial. He answered, "That is very doubtful." While the
Supreme Court upheld the judge in discharging this juror, it also
ruled that there was no error in refusing to sustain the challenge
of the defendant to two other jurors who stated that, although
they had formed opinions from reports, which it would require
evidence to remove, they could try the case fairly and impartially
on the law and the evidence.Y1 3
Baldwin v. State (1848) 12 Mo. 223, 225.
See p. 366, supra.
State v. Brooks (1887) 92 Mo. 542, 575, 5 S. W. 257. Likewise where
a juror has an opinion favorable to the defendant, resulting from news-
paper reports and hearsay, the juror properly is discharged. State v.
Punshon (1895) 133 Mo. 44, 34 S. W. 25.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Supreme Court has held that a juror who had an opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant formed wholly on
public talk was not incompetent when he stated that he could
give an impartial verdict and would not permit the opinion he
had formed on rumor to bias him.164
Where the defendant and one, Butler, had been accused of
committing a robbery jointly, several of the jurors summoned
on the panel in the trial of the defendant, had also qualified but
were not selected to hear the Butler case which was tried the
day before. The jurors knew the two men were charged jointly;
they had heard questions asked by counsel in qualifying a panel
in the previous trial; they had heard the results of the Butler
trial. However, the jurors stated that they had no opinion in
the present case and that they could try the case on the evidence
and under the instructions of the court without regard to any-
thing they had learned concerning the Butler trial. The
Supreme Court held, "A juror, qualified as one of the panel
before the challenges are made and who is then excused before
the trial is begun, is not disqualified from being used again,
simply because of such prior use as tentative juror, if he is
otherwise qualified. The mere fact of having been summoned
and examined as to his qualifications and then excused from the
trial panel does not disqualify a juror from subsequent service
in a case based upon the same or similar facts. The trial judge
was careful to inquire if the challenged juror had formed any
opinion as to the merits of the case.'1°  It follows from the
Supreme Court holding that under the statute there was no
reason for excusing the jurors.
The rule uniformly followed and set forth in a very large
number of cases is that if a juror has an opinion formed of
rumor, public talk, and newspaper reports, he is not therefore
disqualified, even though it will require evidence to change the
opinion of the juror, provided it is clear that he can hear the
' State v. Van Wye (1896) 136 Mo. 227, 243, 37 S. W. 938; State v.
Ashbrook (Mo. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 1037. Accord, where the juror had
discussed the arrest of the defendant with the prosecuting witness. State
v. Dudley (1912) 245 Mo. 177, 149 S. W. 449.
' State v. Ingram (1926) 316 Mo. 268, 271, 289 S. W. 637.
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case with an open mind and render a verdict exclusively on the
evidence under the instructions of the trial court.166
f. Evidence at Former Trials, Preliminary Hearings,
Confessions
In cases in which the juror has read or heard evidence at a
former trial or a preliminary hearing, the courts have wavered
in determining the competency of the juror.
In the leading case of State v. Walton, decided in 1881, Judge
Norton of the Supreme Court said, "Where the venireman has
formed an opinion, either from his own knowledge or from con-
versing with witnesses to the transaction, or from having heard
their testimony on the trial of the cause, he is subject to be chal-
lenged for cause."'" 7
And in the case of State v. Culler, in which the opinion was
delivered by Judge Sherwood in 1884, the court held that one
who has read the evidence taken before the coroner, either as
'"State v. Davis (1860) 29 Mo. 391; State v. Rose (1862) 32 Mo. 346;
State v. Core (1879) 70 Mo. 491; State v. Barton (1879) 71 Mo. 288; State
v. Brown (1880) 71 Mo. 454; State v. Greenwade (1880) 72 Mo. 298; State
v. Burgess (1883) 78 Mo. 234; State v. Stein (1883) 79 Mo. 330; State v.
Hopkirk (1884) 84 Mo. 278; State v. Wilson (1884) 85 Mo. 134; State v.
Reed (1886) 89 Mo. 168; 1 S. W. 225; State v. Cunningham (1889) 100 Mo.
382, 12 S. W. 376; State v. Elkins (1890) 101 Mo. 344, 14 S. W. 116; State
v. Williamson (1891) 106 Mo. 162, 17 S. W. 172; State v. Duffy (1894) 124
Mo. 1, 27 S. W. 358; State v. Schmidt (1896) 136 Mo. 644, 38 S. W. 719;
State v. Dyer (1897) 139 Mo. 199, 40 S. W. 768; State v. Hunt (1897)
141 Mo. 626, 43 S. W. 389; State v. Bronstine (1898) 147 Mo. 520, 49 S. W.
512; State v. Brennan (1901) 164 Mo. 487, 65 S. W. 325; State v. Gartrell
(1902) 171 Mo. 489, 71 S. W. 1045; State v. Collins (1903) 181 Mo. 235,
79 S. W. 671; State v. Snyder (1904) 182 Mo. 462, 82 S. W. 12; State v.
Forsha (1905) 190 Mo. 296, 88 S. W. 746; State v. Sykes (1905) 191 Mo.
62, 89 S. W. 851; State v. McCarver (1905) 194 Mo. 717, 92 S. W. 684;
State v. Miles (1906) 199 Mo. 530, 98 S. W. 25; State v. Vickers (1907)
209 Mo. 12, 106 S. W. 999; State v. Rasco (1911) 239 Mo. 535, 144 S. W.
449; State v. Schmulbach (1912) 243 Mo. 533, 147 S. W. 966; State v.
Walton (1913) 255 Mo. 232, 164 S. W., 211; State v. Herring and Baldwin
(1916) 268 Mo. 514, 188 S. W. 169; State v. Garrett (1920) 285 Mo. 279,
226 S. W. 4; State v. Poor (1921) 286 Mo. 644, 228 S. W. 810; State v.
Smith (Mo. 1921) 228 S. W. 1057; State v. Sherman (1914) 264 Mo. 274,
175 S. W. 73; State v. Samis (1922) 296 Mo. 471, 246 S. W. 956; State v.
Connor (Mo. 1923) 253 S. W. 713; State v. Baker (Mo. 1926) 285 S. W.
416; State v. Woodard (1925) 309 Mo. 19, 273 S. W. 1047; State v. Hicks
(Mo. 1928) 3 S. W. (2d) 230; State v. Davis (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 264;
State v. Yeager (Mo. 1928) 12 S. W. (2d) 30.
1 State v. Walton (1881) 74 Mo. 271, 284.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
originally written or as printed in a newspaper, and formed an
opinion therefrom, in either case, is, as a matter of law, dis-
qualified from serving as a juror.16 8 Against this decision Judge
Norton protested vigorously.
The decision in the Culler case was overruled in the case of
State v. Bryant handed down by the Supreme Court in 1887, the
majority opinion being by Judge Norton. The question arose as
to the qualification of a juror who had formed an opinion based
upon the report of the testimony of the former trial as published
in certain newspapers, and substantially as contained in the
court records. Judge Norton said:
The fact cannot be ignored that in the march of civiliza-
tion there are one or more newspapers in every town and
county of the state, and that as a rule, they are read with
avidity by all the citizens who can read, and when a homi-
cide or other crime is committed the enterprising journalist
publishes the fact with all the attending circumstances.
Such accounts are usually sought after and read with eager-
ness, and it is just as impossible for the reader not to be im-
pressed by it, and not have some opinion concerning it as it
is to throw black ink on a white wall without coloring it.
One of these results is produced by a law of the mind and
the other by a law of matter. The legislature, giving recog-
nition to this law of the mind, expressly provided that opin-
ions formed from newspaper reports and rumors should not
disqualify a person from being a juror, unless it should
further appear that such opinion would bias his judgment
and prevent him from trying the case impartially, and ac-
cording to the evidence adduced on the trial. If all such
persons and readers of newspapers are to be excluded as in-
competent jurors, the result would be that the citizen
charged with a crime would, of necessity, either be com-
pelled to have his cause submitted and tried by a jury of the
most ignorant class in the community, if the state should
exercise its right of peremptory challenge, or to a jury com-
posed of that class of persons who seek to be professional
jurors. Believing the rule so uniformly followed in this
state to be in accord with sound principle and the weight of
authority, and productive of the best results, both for the
accused and the state, no reason is perceived for departing
from, and we adhere to it in all its integrity.16 9
' State v. Culler (1884) 82 Mo. 623.
'State v. Bryant (1887) 93 Mo. 273, 306, 6 S. W. 102.
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The well written dissenting opinion of Judge Sherwood refers
first to the case of Baldwin v. State, which has already been con-
sidered. ° The Judge said:
It is manifest from this ruling that "rumor" and "news-
paper reports" were regarded as legal equivalents, so far as
affecting the competency of a juror is concerned. And
when the legislature, by the revision of 1879,17 added the
words, "newspaper reports," to the existing statute, thus
coupling that phrase with the word "rumor," it will be in-
tended that they did so as manifesting the design of accept-
ing that phrase with the judicial meaning thereto attached;
and by coupling the words mentioned together, in the same
sentence, they meant in this instance to give legislative
sanction and application to two familiar maxims, "noscitur
a sociis," and "copulatio verborum indicat acceptionem in
eodem sensut." If this view is to prevail, the publications in
question cannot be treated as "newspaper reports," but must
needs occupy a higher plane of authenticity, since the news-
paper publications referred to were a substantial report of
the testimony, as given at the first trial, and as embodied in
the present record. Having eliminated from this discussion
all question as to the nature of the publications on which the
opinion of the jurors were founded, and having determined
that they were not "newspaper reports" in either the judi-
cial or legislative sense of the term, it is in order now to in-
quire if those who were declared by the court competent asjurors, were indeed competent. In entering on this inquiry,
it must be confessed that there is often a real, but more
frequently an apparent conflict of authority to be met with
in the adjudged cases. Often some statutory regulation
causes the apparent conflict, and in most states, such regu-
lations are now adopted. Anterior, however, to the adop-
tion of such regulations, it was well settled that the forming
and expression of an opinion as to the guilt of an accused,
disqualified a juror. . . . I do not think that our statute
should receive any forced or strained, but only a reasonable
construction. I do not think that mere evanescent opinions,
or more properly, impressions, "not such as to bias or prej-
udice the minds of the jurors," opinions, or more properly,
impressions, having no better bases than rumor, or its
cogener, newspaper reports, as already defined, should dis-
qualify him. But I do think that our own statute is to be
See pp. 368-9, supra.
... See p. 366, supra.
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our guide, its limitations our limitations, in passing on ques-
tions of this sort. . . . The opinion of those called asjurors, not having been formed on "rumor and newspaper
reports," they did not fall within the terms of the proviso
and were not competent.172
But in two subsequent decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court in 1891 and 1893, the holding in the Bryant case was over-
ruled, the court virtually adopting for its opinions, the line of
reasoning used by Judge Sherwood178 in his dissent in that
case."
4
In the case of State v. Taylor, decided in 1896, with Judge
Sherwood speaking for the majority, the court took the follow-
ing position. "It has been held that the hearing and reading of
fragmentary portions of the evidence of the former trial, and the
forming an opinion thereon, will not of themselves disqualify a
juror; and that in order to his disqualifications, he must have
heard or read all the evidence at the former trial." 17r This state-
ment of law has found support in several cases." 0
The general rule is stated by Judge Gantt in the case of State
v. Foley, decided in 1898. "If a person has formed or expressed
an opinion upon his own knowledge of the facts in the case, or
from conversing with the witnesses in the case, or read the
sworn evidence taken before the coroner on preliminary exami-
nation, or if his opinion has been engendered by hearing the wit-
nesses testify under oath in a former trial of the same case, the
uniform practice has been to reject such a person as incompetent
to serve as a juror... An opinion thus formed does not fall with-
in the exception to the statute as one based merely upon rumor
or newspaper reports, but is strictly within the rule of exclusion
prescribed by the statute which declares it a good cause of chal-
lenge if he has formed or expressed an opinion on the issue or
State v. Bryant (1887) 93 Mo. 273, 283, 6 S. W. 102.
Judge Sherwood's line of reasonbig seems to be derived from the dis-
senting opinions of Judge Henry in State v. Barton (1879) 71 Mo. 288, 290,
and State v. Brown (1880) 71 Mo. 454, 456.
1
'State v. Hulz (1891) 106 Mo. 41, 53, 16 S. W. 940; State v. Robinson
(1893) 117 Mo. 649, 23 S. W. 1066.
State v. Taylor (1896) 134 Mo. 109, '141, 35 S. W. 92.
State v. Duestrow (18D6) 137 Mo. 44, 38 S. W. 554, 39 S. W. 266; State
v. Riddle (1903) 179 Mo. 287, 78 S. W. 606; State v. Sechrist (1909) 226
Mo. 274, 126 S. W. 400; State v. Shackelford (1899) 148 Mo. 493, 50
S. W. 105.
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any material facts to be tried." 177 The Supreme Court has held
that the reading of an unsworn confession,1 78 or the alleged con-
fession of a person not on trial, but who is a witness in the case,1 79
or the reading of extracts of a confession, °0 do not disqualify
jurors who are otherwise competent. A word of warning to
counsel to prove affirmatively that the opinion of the juror is
formed under conditions which disqualify him is set forth in a
recent case.','
A most extraordinary view of the question under discussion
is presented by Judge Burgess of the Supreme Court in State v.
Church, decided in 1906. The Judge says, "The confession as
published in the papers was part of those publications and the
jurors having read them including that confession and formed
opinions therefrom with respect to the guilt of the defendant,
the case is clearly brought within the provisions of" the stat-
ute.'8 2 If the test here used by Judge Burgess had been applied
in each of the cases cited, all jurors who had read sworn con-
fessions, testimony before the coroner, or at a former trial, would
have been held competent. The test applied by Judge Burgess
entirely disregards the rules of law laid down in prior cases, and
in itself, begs the question. If there is to be any line of demar-
cation between competent and incompetent jurors who have read
newspaper reports, that line must be based on the source of the
report. The application of the Burgess test makes a differentia-
tion between jurors based on the source of the report quite im-
possible.
The contest between Judge Sherwood and Judge Norton as to
the construction of the statute was won by Judge Sherwood after
a struggle of seven years' duration. In a sense, the only ques-
tion involved was whether or not the Supreme Court should con-
strue the statute strictly or liberally. The strict constructionist
won; the competency of a juror was made to depend on a his-
torical setting. This was grounded on Judge Sherwood's dis-
sent in the Bryant case, and the basis of that dissent rests on the
.. State v. Foley (1898) 144 Mo. 600, 611, 46 S. W. 733.
"' State v. Myers (1906) 198 Mo. 225, 94 S. W. 242.
State v. Bobbitt (1908) 215 Mo. 10, 114 S. W. 511.
State v. Wooley (1908) 215 Mo. 620, 115 S. W. 417.
"'State v. Darling (1906) 199 Mo. 168, 97 S. W. 592.
State v. Church (1906) 199 Mo. 605, 631, 98 S. W. 16.
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opinion in the Baldwin case. Judge Sherwood's fine distinctions
appear strictly logical, although it is doubtful that the legislature
in 1879 when it amended the statute, had before it the Baldwin
case, decided in 1848; if it did, it is even more doubtful that the
legislature anticipated Judge Sherwood's argument. Judge Mc-
Bride's reference in the Baldwin case to newspaper statements
was not binding upon the legislature. By parallel reasoning, it
might be argued that the legislature acted unnecessarily in 1925
when the statute providing that persons opposed to the death
penalty in capital cases were incompetent as jurors, was amend-
ed in such a way as to permit this disqualification to be waived.
Already in 1921, the same result had been reached by judicial
decision; but when a case arose in 1928, to which the same prin-
ciple was applicable, the court referred authoritatively to the
amended statute and not to its earlier decisions.1" Here the
legislature completely disregarded the court's decision of 1921;
each acted independently of the other. This might have been
the policy of the courts as easily under the Baldwin case, the
amendment of 1879, and subsequent decisions.
However, under the statute opinions on the issue or any ma-
terial fact do disqualify a juror unless such opinions are founded
only on rumor and newspaper reports. Depending upon the
source from which the juror derives his opinion, the court must
hold him competent or incompetent. The line of demarcation
which has been drawn seems more acceptable than any other
line, for opinions obtained as a result of reading or hearing evi-
dence at a former trial or a preliminary hearing are more cal-
culated to prejudice or bias the mind of the juror than opinions
obtained from other sources. The differentiation is artificial;
but apparently unavoidable under the statute. The conclusions
arrived at by the Supreme Court are quite satisfactory. But it
must be observed that there is a tendency to demand a high de-
gree of proof of the facts which render a juror incompetent. As
a result, the number of jurors who are declared incompetent is
reduced. No objection is provoked by this trend in the cases;
neither the defendant nor the state is prejudiced; and a panel
of competent jurors can be secured more readily.
'See p. 57, supra.
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g. Prejudice
Under the statute a juror may be challenged because of his
prejudice in the case. Judge Walker of the Supreme Court once
said, "The test as to the qualification of a juror is his freedom
from prejudice and his consequent ability to give an accused a
fair and impartial trial." 184 Prejudice in criminal cases may be
treated under the same headings as in civil cases, first, prejudice
based on a knowledge of the facts in the case, second, prejudice
arising out of acquaintance with a party to the action, and final-
ly, prejudice resulting from personal bias.
There appear to be only two cases of any importance relating
to prejudice based on a knowledge of the facts in the case. In
an early case in which the defendant was indicted for stealing
cattle, one of the jurors stated upon his voir dire examination
that he knew the cattle which were stolen. The court held that
since the facts concerning which the juror was informed were not
controverted, the juror was competent. The court observed that
in doubtful cases it was a practice of the circuit court to excuse
jurors, and commented favorably on this policy. 85
In the second case, the defendant was prosecuted for an offense
committed after a discharge from the penitentiary. The juror
who was challenged had been a member of the panel which for-
merly convicted the defendant. The court held that the juror
was competent since the offenses were entirely different, the
former conviction was shown upon the record, and the identity
of the defendant was not denied. In this case the juror stated
that he could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial, and
the court did not become aware of the fact that the juror had
served in the former trial until after the trial had begun and
some evidence had been introduced.'8- Under the circumstances
of the case, the objections made to this juror appear to be with-
out substantial foundation.
Two cases have arisen concerning prejudice resulting from
acquaintance with a party to the action. In the first case a juror
testified that his friendship and association with the brother of
the defendant would influence him in reaching a verdict. The
' State v. Miller (1914) 264 Mo. 441, 175 S. W. 191.
'State v. Martin (1859) 28 Mo. 530, 533.
State v. Maloney (1893) 118 Mo. 112, 23 S. W. 1084.
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court held the juror properly excused when challenged on the
theory that the State as well as the defendant is entitled to an
impartial jury.187
In the second case, the court held that the fact that one of the
jurors was well acquainted with the prosecuting attorney and his
assistants, and had been a witness for the state in another case,
did not constitute grounds for a challenge for cause. The juror
on his voir dire examination stated that regardless of his ac-
quaintance, he would try the case fairly according to the law and
the evidence.-I, Technically the juror may have been qualified,
but it is unlikely that any injustice would have resulted had this
juror been excused from the panel.
Instances of prejudice resulting from personal bias are set
forth in a number of cases. In two cases, after the jury had
been empaneled a juror used such language in speaking of the
defendant as to indicate clearly his bias. In both cases the juror
was held to be utterly unfit to pass upon the guilt or innocence of
the party.'89  On the other hand a juror's statement that if the
defendant was guilty he ought to be "sent up" for a year or so
was held not to be an expression of the defendant's guilt and,
standing alone, not to be a ground of challenge for cause.90
In a case in which a juror indicated his prejudice against the
Habitual Criminal Act and was challenged by the State for that
reason, the court ruled that the trial judge properly excused the
juror.'9 In this case it was quite apparent that the juror was
so prejudiced that he was unfit to sit in a cause in which the
Habitual Criminal Act might be invoked. The Supreme Court
has held competent jurors who said they were opposed to the de-
fense of insanity but who stated that they could nevertheless give
the defendant a fair trial. 90 The same ruling was applied in
another case in which it appeared that some jurors, otherwise
qualified, had been dismissed because in a similar case decided
State v. Faulkner (1904) 185 Mo. 673, 84 S. W. 967.
State v. Shoemaker (Mo. 1916) 183 S. W. 322.
State v. Wheeler (1891) 108 Mo. 658, 18 S. W. 924; State v. Nardini
(Mo. A. 1916) 186 S. W. 557.
State v. Hayes (1883) 78 Mo. 307; accord, State v. Burns (1885) 16
Mo. A. 556.
State v. Taylor (Mo. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 474, 478.
State v. Baker (1912) 246 Mo. 357, 152 S. W. 46.
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somewhat earlier they had been successfully challenged on ac-
count of their opposition to the pleading of insanity as a de-
fense."" In a case in which two of the jurors were Klansmen
who had attended an indignation meeting of the Klan called fol-
lowing the killing of the woman for whose death the defendant
was on trial, the jurors were declared competent, since they had
stated that they could give the accused a fair trial, and since no
evidence had been introduced to show the type of meeting that
the Klan had held.14
Statutes relating to the selecting and summoning of jurors
have been construed as directory only; therefore, when a jury
happens to be selected in a manner not strictly in accord with the
statutory provisions, a challenge to the array will be overruled,
unless prejudice can be shown. 1 5 However, the courts have held
that where the prosecuting attorney has suggested names of per-
sons to be placed in the jury wheel,'9 or where he has submitted
a complete list of names some of which thereafter have been
drawn from the wheel,' the defendant's challenge to the array
was properly sustained. It is quite apparent that the greatest
opportunity exists for obtaining prejudiced jurors in those in-
stances in which a representative of the State actually assists in
the selection of the jury for the trial of a case in which he is to
participate. Consequently the rule established in these cases is
an excellent safeguard.
Several cases have arisen involving prejudice against negroes.
In one of these it appeared that a juror, summoned to serve in
the trial of a negro, had at one time had a personal disagreement
with another negro arising from his refusal to take a drink in a
saloon at the same counter as that at which the negro was drink-
ing. The court ruled that the conduct of the juror did not show
such prejudice against the negro race as to disqualify him from
' State v. Fairlamb (1893) 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895.
, State v. Garland (1924) 304 Mo. 87, 263 S. W. 165.
reState v. Pitts (1875) 58 Mo. 556; State v. Knight (1875) 61 Mo. 373;
State v. Albright (1898) 144 Mo. 638; 46 S. W. 620; State v. Jackson
(1901) 167 Mo. 291, 66 S. W. 938; State v. Riddle (1903) 179 Mo. 287, 78
S. W. 606; State v. Woodard (1925) 309 Mo. 19, 273 S. W. 1047; State v.
Jackson (Mo. A. 1921) 227 S. W. 647.
State v. Austin (1904) 183 Mo. 478, 82 S. W. 5.
State v. Haney (1910) 151 Mo. A. 251, 132 S. W. 56.
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serving in the trial of a negro accused of murder."' In a case
in which the juror stated that he was not prejudiced against the
defendant, a negro, but against the negro race in general, the
juror was held competent. However, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that when the case was retried, errors having been com-
mitted, it would be wiser for the trial court in harmony with ab-
solute impartiality to select a panel of jurors who had no un-
kindly feeling toward the class to which the defendant be-
longed.199
An unusual situation arose in the case of State v. Thomas,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1913. In that case, the defend-
ant, a negro, challenged the array on the ground that the jury
commissioners in passing upon the qualifications of persons for
jury service in Jackson County discriminated against colored
persons of African descent. All the judges of the criminal and
circuit courts of Jackson County, except the judge trying the
case, were called as witnesses. They testified that they had not
discriminated against the African race in selecting names of
persons from whom the jurors would be drawn to try the case.
All of the judges but one testified that they had approved some
negroes for jury service, although, they did not remember the
precise number. Their evidence indicated that a larger per cent
of white persons than of negroes (according to the population of
each) was approved for jury service because a great many
negroes were found not to possess sufficient educational qualifica-
tions for jury service, and that of the negroes found qualified
from an educational standpoint a large percentage were minis-
ters, school teachers or physicians, and therefore exempt from
jury service.
The defendant offered to prove that nine hundred negroes in
Jackson County were qualified for jury service, but had never
been summoned to serve. The court held, "This evidence was
rejected, and we think properly so, for the reason that while it
would have tended to prove that the negro race had been dis-
criminated against in the past, it did not tend to prove discrimi-
nation in the particular panel of jurors then in the wheel from
which a jury was drawn to try defendant."2 10  Undoubtedly the
State v. Green (1910) 229 Mo. 642, 129 S. W. 700.
State v. Brown (1905) 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. W. 519.
State v. Thomas (1913) 250 Mo. 189, 202, 175 S. W. 330.
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decision of the court is correct. No prejudice was shown in the
selection of the particular panel; whether in fact prejudice does
exist in the gathering of names for the jury wheel is another
question altogether, and one which cannot be answered positive-
ly, or even beyond any reasonable doubt, unless a detailed study
of the problem is undertaken.
In conclusion, it may be stated, that no dogmatic rule of law
can be laid down for the determination of the qualifications of a
juror in the abstract. Whether or not a juror should be held in-
competent because of his prejudice must be decided on the merits
of each case as it arises. The cases referred to above are at best
guide posts which may assist in solving problems brought to the
attention of the courts.
D. QUALIFICATIONS IN PARTICULAR CLASSES OF COUNTIES
AND CITIES
In the consideration of exemptions of jurors in particular
classes of counties and cities, it was pointed out that one of the
peculiarities of the jury system in this state has resulted from
the policy of the legislature in enacting laws of a general nature
and also laws of a more limited applicability.2 10 This same pe-
culiarity is found iil the system of challenges for cause in Mis-
souri. Quite frequently, identical, although separately enacted,
laws are in force in two different classes of counties or cities.
In considering these laws, each one will be set forth as of the
date of its first enactment; subsequent laws which are identical,
but applicable to counties or cities of different classes, will be
dealt with largely in the footnotes. Whenever such a law has
been construed for one class of counties or cities, the same con-
struction logically applies to the law when in force in another
class of counties or cities.
1. Counties
The policy of the legislature, to which reference has just been
made, was adopted for the first time in 1891 with the enactment
of a series of laws relating to counties. A statute applicable to
counties containing cities from 50,000 to 300,000 inhabitants
provided that "None of the following persons shall be permitted
See p. 236, supra.
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to serve as jurors: First, any member of the national guard or
other organized militia, or fire company; second, any person un-
der the age of 21 years or over the age of 65 years; third, any
person who is not sufficiently acquainted with the English lan-
guage to read and write the same, and to understand thoroughly
the proceedings ordinarily had in courts of justice; fourth, any
person actually exercising the functions of clergyman, practi-
tioner of medicine, druggist, or apothecary, attorney-at-law, or
any professor or other teacher of any school or institution of
learning; fifth, any person of bad reputation or without visible
means of support; sixth, any person who has served on a regu-
lar panel as a juror in any court of record in the county within
one year last past; seventh, any person who has been convicted
of felony; eighth, any person not drawn or selected according to
the provisions of this article. ' 20 2 The law continues in effect
today although the population basis for its applicability has been
changed.203 In 1903 a similar law was enacted applicable to
counties containing from 100,000 to 175,000 inhabitants.2 4 This
law also remains unchanged, except in the provisions defining its
applicability.2 5
The courts have seldom had occasion to construe the statute.
It has been held that the finding of the trial court as to whether
jurors are disqualified under the statutes will not be reversed
unless manifest error appears.2 0  In a case in which a juror
signed the verdict by making his mark, the court ruled that no
absolute proof appeared that the juror could not write as re-
quired by the provisions of the statute.20 7
In passing, reference should be made to another section which
Mo. Laws 1891, p. 173, sec. 8.
1R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 3799; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7312; Repealed, Mo.
Laws 1911, p. 309; Enacted, Mo. Laws 1905, p. 176, sec. 10, as applied to
counties containing cities having a population from 150,000 to 400,(00;
made applicable to counties containing cities having a population from
100,000 to 400,000 inhabitants, Mo. Laws 1907, p. 323, sec, 1; R. S. Mo.(1909) sec. 7327; made applicable to counties having a population from
200,000 to 400,000, Mo. Laws 1911, p. 309; R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 6665.
'Mo. Laws 1903, p. 210, sec. 7.
"R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7296; made applicable to counties having a
population from 60,000 to 200,000, Mo. Laws 1911, p. 307, sec. 10; R. S.
Mo. (1919) sec. 6648.
State v. Jackson ( Mo. 1901) 66 S. W. 938.
Parman v. Kansas City (1904) 105 Mo. A. 691, 78 S. W. 1046.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/4
EXEMPTIONS FROM JURY SERVICE
invariably has followed the law which has just been outlined.
"Any person may challenge any juror for cause, for any reason
mentioned in the last section, and also, for any causes authorized
by the laws of the state.""os This statute is self-explanatory.
A law adopted in 1905 and at that time made applicable to
counties containing cities having a population from 150,000 to
400,000, provided that "No petit juror shall be permitted to serve
on such jury for more than one week consecutively during any
term of court; Provided, that in no case shall this section cause
the discharge of any juror during the actual pendency of the
trial of any cause."20  The law continues in effect today al-
though its applicability has been modified. 2" The same provi-
sion, applicable to counties having a population from 60,000 to
200,000 was adopted by the legislature in 1911, and continues in
operation.211
In the words of Judge Walker of the Supreme Court, "The
purpose of this statute is to free trials from the presence of pro-
fessional jurors and to equalize jury service so that no juror in
the counties designated shall be required, subject to the proviso
contained in the section, to serve more than one week during any
term of court.' 21-2 Accordingly, the court held that jurors who
had served two days in the previous week and were subsequently
excused until the week in which this case was heard, were not in-
competent, since the court construed the statute to limit the
right to challenge to the time of actual service of the juror and
not to the period of his attendance upon the court under the
venire.
In 1911 the legislature enacted the following statute, applica-
ble to juries in counties having a population from 60,000 to 200,-
000. "If upon the t'oir dire it appears that any juror is in the
"Mo. Laws 1891, p. 174, see. 9; R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 3800; R. S. Mo.
(1909) see. 7313; Mo. Laws 1905, p. 176, sec. 11; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec.
7328; R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 6666; Mo. Laws 1903, p. 211, sec. 8; R. S. Mo.
(1909) see. 7297; R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 6649.
' Mo. Laws 1905, p. 177.
' Made applicable to counties containing cities having a population from
100,000 to 400,000, Mo. Laws 1907, p. 323; R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7330; made
applicable to counties having a population from 200,000 to 400,000; Mo.
Laws 1911, p. 309; R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 6668.
'Mo. Laws 1911, p. 307, see. 13; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6651.
' State v. Rose (1917) 271 Mo. 17, 23, 195 S. W. 1013.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
employ of any person, firm, or corporation who has within the
six months last past employed, or who within such time has had
in his or its employ, any attorney on either side of the case being
tried, the opposing party shall have the right to challenge such
juror for cause."213 The law, unmodified, continues in effect to-
day.214 It has been declared constitutional. 21 5
2. Cities
Only two statutes have been enacted relating to the challeng-
ing of jurors in cities. Both are procedural rather than sub-
stantive, and contain provisions relating to the qualifications of
jurors, most of which are also applicable under the general
law.216
E. CONCLUSION
The innumerable problems which have confronted the legisla-
ture and the courts in matters related to the challenging of
jurors for cause are primarily questions of substantive law, not
of procedure. Only when the legislature has divorced the his-
tory and tradition pertaining to the development of the jury
system from the enactment of new and scientific legislation will
the qualifications of jurors throughout the entire state in crim-
inal and civil cases be standardized. And standardization is im-
perative to a smoothly operated jury system.
It must be observed that the jury of today is not the jury
which was known to Blackstone and Chief Justice Marshall.
Increase in population, large cities, new facilities for travel
brought with them jury commissions, jury lists, jury wheels and
many psychological changes. The courts have not been unob-
serving of new developments. Thus Judge Allen said in 1913,
"However, under conditions existing today, we might frequently
find some practical difficulties in the way of applying Lord Mans-
field's ideal rule that 'a juror should be as white as paper.' ,,217
' Mo. Laws 1911, p. 308, sec. 18.
214R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 6655.
Hicks v. Simonsen (1924) 307 Mo. 307, 270 S. W. 318; Privitt v. Rail-
road (Mo. 1927) 300 S. W. 726.
'See R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6679; R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6696; Mo. Laws
1919, p. 430, sec. 25.
1 McManama v. Railroad (1913) 175 Mo. A. 43, 49, 158 S. W. 442.
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In the leading case of Theobald v. Transit Co., the court re-
marked that "The administration of justice has not yet fallen so
low, nor the character of our people become so imbued with
prejudice, that it is impossible to secure a jury that will enter
upon the discharge of its duties with minds perfectly free to see
and declare the right as the facts of the case now show it to be,
untinctured and untainted by the personal whims, bias or preju-
dice of the jurors." 218
Yet in a case of 1892, one of the courts declared, "It is a matter
of common experience that in many classes of cases the securing
of a wholly unbiased jury is next to impossible. '' 21 On the other
hand, Judge Faris feels that "with the world absolutely filled
with unprejudiced jurors," there is no need to fear.220
These expressions of opinion show that the firm belief and
confidence in the jury in a measure have been shaken. The
many complex statutory ramifications which have sprung up in
this state necessitate a reorganization of the jury system. The
thought expressed by Chief Justice Marshall furnishes a very
excellent guide, "I have always conceived, and still conceive, an
impartial jury as required by the common law, and as secured by
the Constitution, must be composed of men who will fairly hear
the testimony which may be offered to them, and bring in their
verdict according to that testimony, and according to the law
arising on it."221
Bearing in mind the statement made by the Chief Justice, one
may well doubt the existence of any rational basis for declaring
incompetent as jurors in all counties having between 60,000 and
400,000 inhabitants, persons who are clergymen, practitioners
of medicine, druggists, apothecaries, professors, teachers, mem-
bers of organized militia, and firemen. 222  That such individuals
should be exempt from jury service is altogether reasonable, but
that they should be disqualified along with persons convicted of
felonies and without visible means of support, is a patent ab-
surdity. If such individuals are willing and able to serve, they
should be welcomed on the jury panel, for the classes here dis-
" Theobald v. Transit Co. (1905) 191 Mo. 395, 428, 90 S. W. 354.Coppersmith v. Railroad (1892) 51 Mo. A. 357, 366.
State v. Mace (1914) 262 Mo. 143, 154, 170 S. W. 1105.
Chouteau v. Pierre (1845) 9 Mo. 3.
See pp. 381-3, supra.
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qualified are composed of those who are highly desirable to raise
the standing of the jury in this state.
Another peculiarity which the presence of this law on the
statute books emphasizes is that in counties having populations
of less than 60,000 inhabitants, the law is inapplicable. In such
counties, the classes of persons just enumerated as desirable for
jury service, are merely exempt, and not disqualified. There is
no logical basis for such a differentiation. The persons disquali-
fied in the larger counties, are no more and no less incompetent
than the same classes of persons in smaller counties, under Chief
Justice Marshall's conception of competency. Nothing but good
could come from the eradication of this illogicality in the law.
For purposes of illustration, the most extreme example has
been selected to emphasize the evils which have resulted from
the legislative dissection of the jury system. So far as the
qualifications of jurors are concerned, it is difficult to understand
why a person who is competent in Jackson County, should not be
just as competent in St. Charles County, Greene County, Ozark
County, or any other county in this State. What benefit is to be
derived from determining the qualifications of a juror according
to the population of the county or city in which he resides? Is
a juror less competent because in the six months last past he has
been in the employ of a person who within such time had in his
employ an attorney in the case where the population of the coun-
ty is 70,000 than he would be if the population of the county
were only 50,000 ?223 Is a juror less competent to serve on a jury
for more than one week consecutively during any term of court
in a county of 80,000 inhabitants than he would be in a county of
55,000 inhabitants ?224
In the light of judicial decisions and the numerous statutes
which have been enacted concerning qualifications of jurors and
the right of challenge in civil and criminal cases, it is obvious
that the statutes now in force need to be revised and codified
for the purpose of clarifying the law and of providing by further
legislative enactments relating to the disqualifications of jurors
which at the present time can be discovered only through a
search of the cases. A series of laws, the constitutionality of
which would be unquestioned, and which would be broad enough
ISee p. 383, supra.ISee pp. 383-4, supra.
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in their scope to cover adequately challenges for cause, could be
drawn up only with considerable difficulty. With an effort to
preserve the sound features of challenges for cause, already pre-
scribed by law, it might be suggested that the following statutes
would in substance approach the model:
Every juror shall be a citizen of the state, resident in the coun-
ty, sober and intelligent, of good reputation, over 21 years of
age, and physically fit for jury service. No witness or person
summoned as a witness, no person who has formed or expressed
an opinion concerning the matter in controversy which may in-
fluence his judgment, no person having such a prejudice in the
cause as to influence his judgment, no person kin to either party
or counsel to a cause within the fourth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, no person unable to speak and write English intel-
ligently, no person who has had prior service on a regular panel
in any court in the county within one year last past, no person
who is or who has been within the six months last past in the
employ of any person, firm, or corporation who within such time
had in his or its employ any attorney in the cause, shall be per-
mitted to serve as a juror. Any juror may be challenged for
cause for any reason herein set forth.
This statute would be applicable in both civil and criminal ac-
tions.'225 It would permit women to serve on juries. This is in
conformity with a suggestion made by Judge Grimm, but as the
Judge pointed out, a constitutional amendment would be neces-
sary to make such a provision effective .26
The eligibility of women would double the number available
for jury service, and therefore permit the courts to be more ex-
acting in choosing the panel. The result should logically be that
the standard of juries in this state would be materially improved.
It is recognized that the existence of good jury laws does not
in itself create an efficient jury system in practical operation.
The statute, itself, seems to prescribe a high standard of quali-
fications for jury service, but that is also true of the statutes now
in force. Upon the discretion exercised by the trial court must
largely depend the ultimate competency of the jury. Up to the
See p. 244, supra.
Grimm, Judicial Administration, MissoUIm CRImE SuRvEY (1926) p.
178, 180.
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present time it is extremely doubtful that trial courts have made
even a reasonable effort in this matter.
While it has been recognized that a constitutional amendment
would be necessary to qualify women for jury service, for the
courts to select male jurors more critically would not be uncon-
stitutional. In the leading case of Vaughn v. Scade, 221 decided
in 1860, Judge Scott said, "The term 'trial by jury' was well
known and understood at the common law, and in that sense it
was adopted in our bill of rights. Of course the non-essentials
of that institution, such as concern the qualifications of jurors,
the mode of summoning them, and many other such matters,
were left to the regulation of law. The Constitution is pre-
served in retaining the substance of that form of trial as it was
known and practiced among those from whom we derived it.
This subject has undergone examination in other tribunals, and
we find them concurring in those views."
The views so well expressed by Judge Scott have received the
hearty support of the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases,
in one of which the court remarked, "It never could have, in our
opinion, been intended to tie up the hands of the people them-
selves through their chosen representatives so that no beneficial
changes and regulations of the trial by jury could be made as
subsequent experience might dictate, as long as the essentials
are preserved." 228
An additional model statute pertaining to challenges in crim-
inal cases would be necessary:
No person who was a member of the grand jury or inquest by
which any indictment or presentment was found in any cause
in which he is summoned to serve as a petit juror, no person
whose person or property was alleged in the indictment to have
been injured, nor any person kin to him within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, no person who has read or heard the
sworn confession of the accused, or full reports of the testimony
at a former trial, or a preliminary hearing shall be permitted to
serve as a juror. These disqualifications shall furnish valid
bases for challenges for cause. The representative of the state
"TVaughn v. Scade (1860) 30 Mo. 600.
' State v. Hamey (1901) 168 Mo. 167, 192, 67 S. W. 620. See State ex
rel. Railroad v. Slover (1896) 134 Mo. 607, 36 S. W. 50.
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may challenge for cause, in cases in which the death penalty may
be inflicted jurors whose opinions preclude them from finding
any defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death, and,
in any case, jurors opposed to convicting a defendant on circum-
stantial evidence alone where the prosecution is based on circum-
stantial evidence and jurors opposed to convicting the defendant
of a violation of the Habitual Criminal Act where the case in-
volves the application of that act.
It is not urged that the grounds for challenge set forth in
these two model statutes are complete and full in themselves.
While they may prove inadequate in some particulars, it must
be remembered that the courts of this state consistently have
held that because certain grounds for challenge are enumerated
in statutes, it does not follow that the trial judge is precluded
from sustaining challenges to jurors for reasons not mentioned
therein. 22 9 Thus any statutory deficiencies may be cured 'by
court decisions.
The statute which has been in force for many years declaring
residents of counties or cities which are parties to actions com-
petent to serve as jurors is entirely satisfactory and an excellent
modification of the old common law rule.2 30
The proposed reforms which have been outlined can, of course,
not be viewed as panaceas for the evils of the jury system in this
state, but it may reasonably be expected that a reorganization of
the type suggested;" will raise the standard of jurors, so that the
public will have its confidence renewed in trial by jury and in
the competency of the twelve men who sit as triers of facts in
the cause--a jury of our peers.
- See p. 258, supra.
See pp. 253-255, supra.
" A series of model statutes with references to jury laws in many states
is set forth in American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2 (March, 1929) pp. 30-34, and pp. 254-318.
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